In the past five years, while warfare in Kosovo, Iraq and Chechnya has
drawn attention worldwide, a far more deadly struggle has raged in Africa,
largely ignored by international news media. The multinational war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo has claimed more lives than any since World
War II -- at least 3.2 million, according to the International Rescue
Committee. The contending armed forces are not huge, and military
casualties are light. But the civilian death toll rises by more than a
thousand per day. Most victims aren't shot or knifed but instead are
chased away from their farms and homes by armed thugs. The most
vulnerable, especially the very young or weak, simply die of starvation or
disease in the bush. Ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, cannibalism, child
soldiers and massive illegal exploitation of natural resources are all
outrages of this war.
Despite various political agreements, peace has been elusive.
Factionalized rebel armies, foreign troops and warlords continue to fight
among themselves and against pro-government militias. Since 1999 a small
U.N. peacekeeping unit has been operating in Congo. It was formed with the
best of intentions: to help implement nascent political agreements. But it
is badly overstretched. A recent increase from 5,700 to 8,700 troops will
have minimal effect in a country more than five times the size of Iraq.
While it is technically a peacekeeping operation, the U.N. mandate allows
the use of armed force to protect U.N. personnel and operations, and in
certain cases to protect Congolese civilians. Unfortunately, the mandate
has been exercised sparingly, and the gangs of armed teenagers making up
the majority of the warring factions murder, rape and plunder with
impunity.
Congo is not the only place where U.N. peacekeeping has failed to
stanch a hemorrhage of civilian deaths. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone
suffered from much the same situation: populations dying of disease and
malnutrition while international peacekeeping efforts floundered due to
lack of credible force. But when rebels in Sierra Leone routed 8,000 U.N.
troops three years ago, the British needed only 800 soldiers to restore
U.N. authority.
On Friday, the U.N. Security Council authorized 1,200 multinational
troops led by France to deploy to a town in eastern Congo where rampaging
ethnic militias have besieged hundreds of U.N. peacekeepers and thousands
of Congolese civilians. This welcome Western interest will stem the
violence temporarily, but the troops' firm departure date of Sept. 1 means
the U.N. peacekeepers will again have to address Congo's brutal conflict
with inadequate capabilities in the near future.
Humanitarian groups make the case for more troops and a stronger
mandate but face the perplexing problem of today's "Westernless"
peacekeeping: Stronger mandates make states less inclined to contribute
troops. Worse, the professionalism of troops eventually proffered to U.N.
operations is often questionable. Reportedly some deployed troops have
made special arrangements with the United Nations specifically stating
they will not use armed force for any reason.
There is another solution. A number of for-profit companies with years
of experience in peace operations have been formed into a consortium and
are prepared to fill the vacuum in Congo. In recent years international
peace operations have increasingly relied on the private sector to provide
essential services, with impressive success thus far. Aviation companies
have proven willing to brave bullets to support peacekeepers in West
Africa, and logistics companies have provided remarkably efficient
services even in the midst of widespread chaos where little else
functions. This private consortium is offering the most comprehensive
package yet assembled to assist U.N. peacekeeping.
The consortium would operate under the U.N. commander and would bring
the means and motivation to carry out the full mandate by providing key
services to fill the gaps in the Congo unit's capabilities: high-tech
aerial surveillance and armed rapid deployment police (including nearly
500 former British Gurkhas from Nepal) who could bring years of
peacekeeping experience and NATO-level professionalism. They would be
assigned specifically to protect vulnerable populations, while a
helicopter firm would be able to quickly transport the police to hot spots
as well as assist with emergency evacuations and humanitarian supply.
Another firm would give Congolese gendarmes police and human rights
training so they could gradually take over the quick reaction duties,
control the international borders and ultimately supplant the U.N.
peacekeepers. The private consortium would be a "force multiplier," making
the U.N. operation substantially more effective for a fraction of the cost
of its current budget. This private sector option could even be a model
for improved peace operations in the future.
The ultimate solution, of course, must be Congolese, and the U.N.
nongovernmental organizations and political bodies should be the ones to
facilitate the peace process, not the private firms. Likewise, once
security has been restored, reconstruction and reconciliation are better
handled by the many innovative and knowledgeable nongovernmental and
international organizations experienced in those tasks.
Critics of the concept, especially those in the United Nations' own
Department of Peacekeeping, worry about the precedent of using armed
private companies for tasks traditionally reserved to national armies. Yet
the United Nations itself hires armed private security to protect its
warehouses and offices. In light of the continuing carnage, many wonder
why similar firms are not allowed to protect people as well. Plans for
reforming U.N. peacekeeping are at least a decade from fruition. Until
then, the status quo is a death sentence for millions.
The writer is president of the International Peace Operations
Association, an organization founded to promote greater use of private
firms in international peacekeeping. It operates as a nonprofit
association and is funded by companies involved in peace operations.
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