The following text is the content of a background guidance document drafted for discussion at the forthcoming Harvard University and the National and KOC University of Istanbul sponsored Harvard World Model United Nations (WorldMUN) conference to be held in Istanbul in late March 2001. WorldMUN is a simulation of multilateral diplomacy which brings together interested parties from around the world to debate pressing global issues.

Each year hundreds of university students gather in a different city for a five day conference during which they negotiate issues ranging from anti-terrorism to climate control. Students attend one of 15 committees as representatives of a country whose interests they must protect and pursue as they strive to hammer out agreements.

The following background paper has been prepared for the conference committee simulating the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The original Internet page containing the paper can be accessed by clicking here. (Note: it is the second paper on that page and no drafting date or author information is available.)

It should be noted that the paper contains a number of errors which will inevitably influence the views of participants at the forthcoming conference, for example, allegations that Executive Outcomes personnel were involved in illegal diamond mining during the period they were deployed in Sierra Leone and that Sandline, which had provided military support to the legitimate, democratically elected and internationally supported Sierra Leonean government "was expelled" from that country.

The text of the document reads as follows:

Statement of the Problem

In the middle of Johannesburg, South Africa, a tall, typical, steel-and-glass skyscraper houses offices that could very easily pass for the headquarters of a normal, corporate venture. This image is further enforced by the seemingly stereotypical banner above the reception desk that is emblazoned with words just as easily imaginable on Wall Street: "Executive Outcomes." However, these offices are far from stereotypical, as they house one of the prominent mercenary groups in Africa, a group whose name belies its military intent. Executive Outcomes is one of numerous mercenary-providing "security firms" that exist both in and outside Africa, and that have played major roles in shaping the continent's destiny. From Mozambique to Sierra-Leone, various mercenary groups have intervened in internal conflict, at the request of one of the fighting parties, and helped expedite some form of resolution. However, mercenaries have also been known to unnecessarily protract conflict, destabilize African nations and aggravate various social problems, as well as raise ethical questions, resulting in much controversy with regard to their worth and necessity on the continent.

The mercenary question is far from outdated, despite the absence of mercenary operations in current conflicts in Africa. A UN law banning mercenary use is yet to be ratified and as such, these soldiers of fortune continue to search for business opportunities in war-torn nations. This issue therefore remains salient, and virtually unexplored by such bodies as the OAU. Mercenaries have helped shape the destinies of African countries and will continue to do so as long as they are allowed to operate and likely even if they are declared illegal. It is therefore imperative that some stand be taken by the OAU with regard to their nature and activities. It seems to be logical that the OAU get involved. However, it is after this involvement that extreme caution must be taken and objectivity must be the key word, for the mercenary question is complex and multi-faceted. The current idea on the UN table is complete eradication of mercenaries. We, as the OAU, should strive to remove ourselves from this pre-existing negative perceptions of mercenaries and look at the subject with a freshness and open-mindedness all our own, because nothing, especially the Mercenary Question, is cut and dry.

History of the Problem

Mercenaries have probably existed since the beginning of war people with no obvious strains of patriotism towards any of the warring parties, who intervene to fulfil a particular goal. This goal has nothing to do with national pride, sacrifice or love, but is solely professional as professional to a mercenary as scoring a goal would be to a professional soccer player from Nigeria in an Athenian soccer club. It is all about the money. Granted, mercenaries, being human, probably get mild rushes from their victories, or disappointments from their losses, that are in no way monetary, but the ideal mercenary outfit would have no human feeling but the desire to complete a mission.

In an effort to give a general overview of the mercenary issue in Africa, this guide will deal with a case study of a fairly typical conflict a government versus a group of rebels in a fairly typical nation a small, underdeveloped country prone to discontent with the involvement of a fairly typical mercenary outfit a large, professional corporate venture based in Southern Africa. Hopefully, this study of Sierra Leone and the mercenary-involved strife that has almost torn it into shreds over the past years will provide insight into most of the dynamics of mercenaries and enable the OAU to reach a better-informed decision on this question.

Synopsis of the Sierra Leone Crisis

On 23 March 1991, a group of fighters comprising Sierra Leonean dissidents (mostly former university students), Liberian fighters, and mercenaries from Burkina Faso invaded Sierra Leone. In May of the same year, the president of Sierra Leone looked towards Britain, which had been an ally for quite some time, for assistance, but the Ministry of Defense turned him down, leaving the under-staffed Sierra Leone army with no recourse but to turn to mercenaries if Sierra Leone hoped to repel the rebels successfully.

Between 1992 and 1994, the Sierra Leonean Army proved incapable of thwarting the rebels' onslaught, and sometimes even co-operated with them, causing the government to split into factions due to internal disputes over the army's ineffectiveness. The rebels attacked economic targets in Sierra Leone such as diamond mines, sometimes with the help of "Sobels," Sierra Leone Army officers who were rebels by day and soldiers by night. In April of 1992, Valentine Strasser took over the Sierra Leone government, appointing Solomon Musa as his right hand man (both are now in exile financed by the British Foreign Office, as law students in Britain). The tables of war turned slightly with Strasser's leadership and the rebels were pushed into Liberia. Unfortunately, Liberia's Charles Taylor was on the rebels' side, and he aided them to regain a foothold in the conflict. The Rebels United Front (RUF) advanced towards the capital of Sierra Leone, capturing as it went along Italian nuns, British expatriates and miners. In a desperate move, Strasser requested Britain for the aid of British Army Gurkhas, a renowned, elite wing of the British Army. However, surprisingly, the Gurkhas failed, their commander was killed, and they left the country.

In 1995, quickly running out of options and time, Strasser invited a South African private security force, Executive Outcomes, led by Eeben Barlow to assist him. This proved to be a very wise decision, for Executive Outcomes' initial operation, defending Freetown in collaboration with Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, was highly successful, leading to an RUF retreat. Executive Outcomes became the talk of the region, with many people even venturing to suggest that Nelson Mandela had had a hand in sending them to Sierra Leone. This particular question remained unresolved, but Executive Outcomes kept living up to their side of the bargain. In December of 1995, Barlow and his mercenaries retook diamond-mining areas from the rebels in rural Sierra Leone and provided security to allow internal refugees to return. In addition, Executive Outcomes trained and gave logistical support to one of the rural militias, the "Kamajors," which had emerged to provide local defense in absence of help from an incompetent, corrupt Sierra Leone Army. By January 1996, Executive Outcomes, together with the Kamojors and Nigerian troops, conclusively defeated the RUF, chasing them out of Sierra Leone.

Just when things seemed to be headed towards peace, with the rebel movement seemingly annihilated and Executive Outcomes' mission complete, Julius Maada-Bio overthrew Strasser. He was a friend of Nigeria's Sani Abacha, and he set the stage for Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's entry into the role of president, with Hinga Norman (leader of the Kamajors) becoming Deputy Minister of Defense. Kabbah's security was always in jeopardy, and he barely managed to stay in power, with the support of the ethnic militia, South Africa mercenaries and Nigerian troops. Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, put continual pressure on Kabbah's government, refusing to come to a reconciliation or even hold talks, until Executive Outcomes had withdrawn. A peace agreement was signed between the RUF ad Kabbah in November 1996, on condition that Executive Outcomes would leave, and in January 1997, the mercenaries did depart. Kabbah, still anxious about his safety, kept the militia as guards and the Nigerian army maintained two battalions in Freetown.

Without Executive Outcomes to thwart any further insurgence, anarchy erupted in Sierra Leone. John Paul Koroma led a successful coup against Kabbah in May 1997, an ousting about which the RUF was overjoyed. Kabbah, discontent with the status quo and anxious to return to power, allegedly sought assistance from yet another company called Sandline International, "in providing military backing and assisting his return to power."

Supposedly, mining and financial companies interested in or holding assets in Sierra Leone supported, and even partially funded the hiring of Sandline International, which was also said to have exported military equipment and helicopters to Sierra Leone, despite a UN embargo. "That government was ultimately overthrown and the company expelled from the country," notes a United Nations report on the activities of mercenary outfits in the region.

As is evident, there is no easy way to resolve the Sierra Leone crisis, or anything of similar nature anywhere in the world. However, it seems that the presence of Executive Outcomes in this particular case did expedite resolution of the initial conflict, bringing about at least temporary respite and a promise of peace to come. Without Executive Outcomes' intervention, the Sierra Leone conflicts could have escalated into a full-scale war, that perhaps would have included the two neighboring nations that seem to have vested interests in the final outcome Liberia and Nigeria. Arguably, therefore, it was better to have the mercenaries involved in this situation than to leave the war to the warring parties themselves. Sandline International also helped to oust from power the very incompetent Koroma, reinstating Kabbah in an operation that perhaps was not a good precedent to set, but which did improve the situation slightly. Sierra Leone slowly degenerated towards entropy with the absence of these security firms, and one cannot help but wonder whether this is coincidental or not. Could the mercenaries have been directly responsible for the temporary peace in the region? Is it possible that they actually made a bad situation better, and could have set Sierra Leone on a path towards eventual recovery if they had stayed in the country longer?

Despite these hypothesized advantages of mercenary outfits, there still remain many widely publicized disadvantages. For one, mercenaries are often said to merely scratch the surface in their quest for a fulfilled mission objective, and, as mentioned in Topic Area A, treat the symptoms and not the actual disease. For example, Executive Outcomes, in the Sierra Leone situation, merely temporarily quelled a conflict, driving a resistance movement underground through use of force and military strategy. The resurgence of the rebellion on their departure clearly illustrates their ineffectiveness in dealing with the root cause of whatever conflict prompted the war.

Mercenary outfits are often also dubbed with the title "Corporate Colonialists," due to the dues they demand for their work. Many mercenary operations require everything from jet fuel for their planes, to food, to ammunition and of course always want that inevitable profit, which is why they are in the business to begin with. The sum of these amounts is staggering, and many nations, especially those in Africa and other underdeveloped regions pay a huge price, relative to their fairly small Gross Domestic Products, in order to enlist mercenaries. In many African nations, resources of the land have had to be mortgaged in order to have mercenaries in place. In the Congo, for example, the London-based firm Defense Systems Ltd. has been made responsible for guarding various mining and petroleum installations, but it also has a share in the output of these installations. This is turned into an even larger cost than it is in absolute terms, or even in comparison to GDP, when the opportunity cost of these resources is considered. These are scarce resources that could be used to eradicate poverty, rehabilitate infrastructure, build the economy and generally help the country along towards development. Instead, they are spent on soldiers of fortune.

The various other popular cons of mercenary use include their purported "amoral" nature for example, Executive Outcomes was in the past accused of using fighters from apartheid governments. Also, their lack of the checks and balances that maintain order and discipline in the ranks of government-run forces has often been cited as a potential hazard. This is because, ruled only by business laws as these Security Firms are, and being as powerful as they have shown themselves to be, they can be immensely dangerous if they run amok, and completely beyond any sort of control. An example of a mild situation of this nature again appears in the Sierra Leone conflict. Executive Outcomes was purportedly involved in illegal diamond extraction and looting in various prime diamond locations of Sierra Leone, taking for personal gain resources that were and still are essential to the survival of the nation.

In light of all these disadvantages, though, it is evident that mercenaries have been effective in bringing about peace in certain regions, and as the United Nations itself recognizes, peace is priceless. And therein lies the quandary. What to do about mercenaries?

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights recently released a "Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights nd impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination," submitted by Mr. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Special Rapporteur pursuant to Commission resolution 199/7. This report leaves no question about the United Nations' views on mercenaries and mercenary use. Is it not therefore surprising that a UN convention against mercenaries, adopted by the UN General Assembly as far back as December 1989, is rotting away in the archives for want of nations to ratify the document? Ballesteros, the UN Rapporteur on Mercenaries, appeals to UN member states to ratify, "as soon as possible," the long dormant convention whose objective is to outlaw mercenaries fighting mostly in Africa's current civil wars. Though the nine-year old convention needs 22 ratifications to become international law, only 16 of the 185 member states have so far ratified it.

Why this reluctance to outlaw mercenaries if they seem to be so evil? Is it perhaps because many nations understand their necessity in certain situations; their ability to get results; their benefits? Perhaps a more "friendly" approach to mercenary operations would be better supported, and maybe even help establish what different nations' sentiments really are about this issue. One proposal is the establishment of an international register for mercenary firms, similar to the UN register of conventional arms. This was a proposal put forth last year, in a report entitled "Soldiers of Fortune Ltd." authored by the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. A novel idea, yes, but definitely one worth considering.

Past OAU Actions

The OAU has remained relatively uninvolved in making a decision either way on the mercenary question. So many African nations have used mercenaries at one point or other, or have endorsed their use in neighboring countries, that most are unwilling to publicly give an opinion about their employment. This is a virtually unopened Pandora's box, at least in formal OAU debate, and the committee therefore has an opportunity to set a precedent for future discussions on the matter. It is hence of utmost importance that this issue be approached with caution, information and most of all, an open mind.

Proposed Solutions

As stated above, the OAU has not gotten very involved in discussions about mercenary use in African countries, partly because it has so many other pressing priorities to consider. However, this question is gaining more and more prominence, especially in the wake of Sierra Leone's mercenary employment, and pressure is on to produce some thing substantive on the topic. The United Nations has deliberated on this issue and generally speaking, decided that mercenaries should be outlawed, as evidenced by Special Rapporteur Ballesteros' report on mercenaries and the UN convention against mercenary use. Ballesteros' report claims that mercenaries undermine fundamental human rights and a people's right to self-determination. Efforts therefore seem to be towards completely eradicating mercenaries and insisting that conflicts both within and between nations be resolved solely by the involved parties, for reasons of patriotism or other noble ideals.

However, we must strive to look further than this, considering both sides of this coin as objectively as is humanly possible. There is undoubtedly controversy about the use of mercenaries in wars that have nothing to do with them. Many people outwardly oppose their use, claiming unfairness, drains on national resources, mercenaries' amoral nature and corporate colonization as backing for their arguments. Perhaps mercenaries do drain national resources, and perhaps they are driven more by money than they are by noble patriotism, and perhaps they do put countries in almost insurmountable debt. However, we must ask ourselves how different this is from the alternative situation, and whether it is better or not. National armies, especially in war-torn and therefore heavily militarized African nations are gigantic drains on these nations' revenues, and a large percentage of the annual budget spending of most countries is allocated to that amorphous giant, "Defense." Consider how much would be saved, and could be re-allocated if defense spending was on sub-contracted firms, such as Sandline International, Defense Systems Ltd. and Executive Outcomes, especially in nations whose internal spending is so characterized by mismanagement and corruption. All the funds allocated to national armies could be paid to defense firms for similar purpose, with contracts and the business-like, professional nature of these firms ensuring the money is spent in an optimal efficient way. Perhaps this would even result in savings and spending of the surplus on more beneficial projects, such as health, education, or infrastructure development.

When considering the "amoral" nature of mercenary outfits, which has formed the crux of many arguments against them, we also must look at the context in which this immorality is viewed: war. The question that then arises is whether there can ever be inherently amoral behavior during a period of bloodshed, disarray and complete disintegration of normal societal values and rules, especially when the group accused of this amorality is merely another participant in the fray. Does it really matter what the respective fighters are fighting for? Whether it be patriotism, martyrdom, nationalistic pride, or money, they are still fighting, just like everyone else. By what yardstick, then are mercenaries considered to be amoral?

The subject "proposed solutions" turns out to be as amorphous as anything, for the Mercenary Question remains ill-defined and under-discussed and ultimately, extremely subjective. Perhaps, though, hopefully, all these different, subjective, individually tailored views that are bound to surface in the committee will be able to be compressed and juxtaposed to come up with something probably very avant-garde, but which just might be the kind of mish-mash solution a mish-mash question like this needs. Whatever the case, delegates should not shy away from exploring new ideas and perhaps, making history.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

As I'm sure has been surmised from the information thus far, a resolution on this issue will not be the easiest or simplest thing at which to arrive. However, as daunting as the task may seem, it is the OAU's challenge and obligation to find a solution that meets all the specifications of a comprehensive UN-quality resolution.

The major issues with which a potential resolution must deal include whether or not mercenary outfits, or "Security Firms" should be officially recognized, as suggested by the Center for Defense Information, based in Washington DC, and compiled in a comprehensive register, or officially declared illegal and banned. Other questions to feature in a resolution revolve around the worth, or lack thereof, of mercenaries and how beneficial or disadvantageous they are to various countries.

Another issue, which is perhaps more immediately pressing than anything else discussed thus far, is some way to regulate the existing mercenary outfits' activities and ensure that they do not adversely affect the nations in which they operate. Executive Outcomes, for example, should not have been able to loot the Sierra Leonean diamond mines as it did, and there should be available some form of recourse for nations exploited by mercenaries as Sierra Leone was. Mercenaries cannot be given completely free rein, and must understand that they live in a world with rules, and like every other human being, must abide by these, if human rights and harmonious society are to be upheld.

Though the "goodness" or "badness" of mercenaries is an ultimate decision, the committee should try and restrain itself from tackling this question directly, as the philosophical complexities of such a query are bound to leave everyone wading in a quagmire of ideals and opinions, with no consensus in sight. However, the question should not be entirely discarded. Instead, short-term issues relating to mercenaries, such as those highlighted above, should be deliberated upon and inevitably, if all these nuances of the problem are properly worked out, that ultimate answer for which we all long will make itself quite evident. A challenge, yes. Insurmountable, not at all.

Bloc Positions

As are many other issues related to the mercenary question, bloc positions are fairly vague, with many nations neither explicitly supporting nor rejecting mercenary use as an option, both for themselves, and other nations. African countries that are outwardly against mercenary use, despite many of them having employed soldiers of fortune to quell their own internal conflicts, include Cameroon, Mauritania, Seychelles, Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These nations have ratified the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of mercenaries. Sierra Leone, of course, cannot have anything against mercenary use, a fact that is true for many other countries that have employed or are employing mercenaries in their various war situations. Countries' opinions generally depend on their respective histories, and the degree of liberal thinking in their present governments. To decipher a particular nation's views, therefore, further research must be done into that specific country.

Suggestions for Further Research

Online searches yield a wide variety of results on this issue, and provide both specific information on the African situation, as well as more general background reading on mercenaries. "Africa Confidential," a comprehensive newsletter on the internal politics and activities of Africa that would not be found in other, more mainstream publications also provides valuable information about mercenary employment in the continent.

In Closing . . .

The Mercenary Question epitomizes a complex, controversial, yet very relevant issue in Africa, and is bound to cross many thin lines many times before something conclusive is decided. This fact, we must never lose sight of, and the committee must remember that it is imperative to deal with the various little idiosyncrasies that this issue seems ensconced in. An easy way out may be a tempting option, but may also be an even more ineffective option than leaving the matter untouched. So if we must trudge through a desert of desolation and never-ending hazards, we must trudge, but we must also never lose sight of the green pastures that await us in the oasis that our continent will hopefully become, if we succeed.

Idealism. Without it, neither the United Nations nor the Organization of African Unity would be in existence. And we would not be here today. So it is not a crime to strive towards a perfect world.

Bibliography

Amnesty International. Sierra Leone : Recommendations to the International Contact Group on Sierra Leone.New York, N.Y. (322 8th Ave., New York 10001) : Amnesty International, 1999.

Congress, first session Sierra Leone, prospects for peace and stability: hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth [i.e.Sixth]. U.S. G.P.O. : March 23, 1999.

Dorney, Sean. The Sandline affair : politics and mercenaries and the Bougainville Crisis. Sydney : ABC Books for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1998.

Guy, Arnold. Mercenaries : the scourge of the Third World. Basingstoke: MacMillan ; New York : St. Martin's Press, 1999.

http://www.africanews.org/specials/19980519_feat23.html

http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/editorial/97/02/28/war.html

http://www.cis.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1982/4/82.04.07.x.html