On June 5th 2000, Sandline International, a United Kingdom based private military company (PMC) wrote an open letter to the United Nations calling for a policy shift in the UN peacekeeping operations. The letter expressed uncertainty on the success of the UN's peacekeeping initiatives in the world due to the use of ill-equipped and inadequately trained troops from helpful nations.

"The UN should consider supplementing the efforts of these troops by contracting private military companies to provide the cadre of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers who can plan, lead and enhance skills of these forces in the field," read the letter.

The unsatisfactory performance of the UN's peacekeeping operations in Africa and all over the world is not debatable. The debacles in Somali, Sierra Leone and currently in Democratic Republic of Congo are instances where UN operations have failed to make a change. Faced with this reality, the question of what should be done to bring about peace in volatile nations is as relevant as ever. And could the message delivered by Sandline International be a sign of the things to come?

"The UN does not require any assistance to carry out peacekeeping missions in Africa or anywhere in the world. I believe the UN has the capacity and the will to restabilise nations ravaged by war," says Klaus Toepfer, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environmental Programme UNEP and the representative of the UN Secretary General here.

Military analysts and development stakeholders in Africa have ignited a debate on whether private security initiatives should be utilised to quell some of internal wars that are ravaging Africa. What this means is that private military/police companies could be legally contracted to assist in stabilising nations ravaged by internal war.

"PMCs remain the best option for restabilising Africa nations. The reality is that African wars are going to continue to take the lives of thousands of innocent people and waste most of Africa's wealth until we do something decisive to end those wars. Whether we like the idea of paying them or not, PMCs can quickly end the violence. They can bolster fledgling democracies and intimidate warlords into peace agreements," says Doug Brooks a Bradlow Fellow of the South Africa Institute of the International Studies.

Global Coalition for Africa GCA, a north-south body with development interest in Africa in its 2000 annual report says that although in recent years, Africa governments have shown more interest in conflict management and post conflict reconstruction, they have ignored one entity: the attention to privatisation of security in Africa. GCA says that this is despite the idea's close connection to armed conflict, civil unrest and interruption of [fragile] democratic processes.

"That PMCs have emerged to provide security is a stunning indication of the weakness of some Africa states and may have ramifications in many countries. PMCs whether operating in the military or civil spheres are not a long-term solution to African problems. Indeed, relying on them may aggravate already difficult situations by further eroding the capacity of public institutions to ensure order. This could undermine the legitimacy of the state, " warns the GCA 2000report.

Doug Brooks, Bradlow Fellow of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), says that Africa needs its own robust peace operations capability in the form of military that can quickly and effectively deal with complex situations and that is not shy to use force where necessary. He however says that the reality of peacekeeping operations in Africa offer no choice but to use PMCs. "PMCs can deploy faster, operate more professionally, act more decisively, enter riskier environment and costs substantially less than a UN managed operation(s). PMCs are thus readily available and affordable to Africa," says Brooks.

Indeed, PMCs are cheaper to deploy and more efficient in the restabilization process. Recently, former officers of the now defunct PMC, Executive Outcomes (EO), recently prepared a document showing how they could have had troops on the ground in Rwanda within two weeks of being called. According to the document, EO could have ended the genocide for only $150 million and succeed in saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent African. In a comparable situation, the UN is currently spending an estimated $90 million a month for its operations in Sierra Leone

Doug Brooks and even the GCA 2000 report admit that PMCs are not mercenaries of yester-years whose role was to destabilise rather than stabilise nations. Current PMCs maintain the same structures and offices of legitimate companies and work within the bounds of domestic and international law. "Their long term business outlook motivates them to guarantee excellence and transparency. With proper safeguards and strict regulations, these companies would likely prove to be a power catalyst for peace in Africa. They can be a potent tool for Africa Renaissance and their potential should not be dismissed" says Brooks.

Talking about renaissance, analysts are quick to point the use of private security firms during the realization of the Italian Renaissance between 14th and 16th centuries. Then known as condettieri, citizens of the Italian city states were engaged in international trade and astounding cultural professions, hence city states often hired the condettieri to provide security.

Could the same apply to Africa? Brooks, "Private militaries can do a number of tasks necessary for peace and development in Africa. They can provide security that encourages foreign investment - creating jobs, paying taxes and stimulating economies. Currently this security takes the form of protection for foreign industrial sites and workers. Its conceivable that they could also be used to protect transportation networks from bandits and help to provide security during typically tense elections. They can work with regional organizations such as ECOWAS or SADC to help protect fledgling democracies from internal coups, warlords or external invasions. I don't see how the African renaissance can reach its full potential without ending these conflicts. Working with PMCs, Africans can end the conflicts quickly and affordably, allowing Africa to truly blossom".

Since independence, the size of the African military in proportion to the population has continued to decline. This is against the widely held believe that Africa military is large and expensive, although in some specific instances they are and guzzle a substantial proportion of the annual national budgetary provisions. On the other hand is the fact hat while some Africa militaries have high professional standards, others have declined because of politicisation, corruption, poor management and lack of civilian oversight.

According to GCA, in 1963, the average African army had 0.73 soldiers for every thousand people. By 1979, that figure had more than quadrupled to 3.1 soldiers for every one thousand people. But the size began to decrease so that by mid-1990s, there were only 2.0 soldiers for every one thousand people across the continent. This is below the developing country's average of 3.5 soldiers for every one thousand people.

In analysing the continued use of private military companies PMCs in Africa, the GCA report says that most recent armed conflicts in Africa have been internal, typically in states with poor governmental legitimacy and weak institutions like in Sierra Leone, DRC, and Angola. It is in this environment that PMCs have come to fore. PMCs have been employed in countries that have sizeable mineral deposits with mining concession as payment. If governments employ PMC as a last resort and cannot pay by other means, they are likely to mortgage future returns from minerals or other resources.

Establishing PMCs needs little fixed assets and can draw on a ready pool of former, military personnel from Africa and other countries who have few options for employment. Currently in Africa, services on offer to PMCs include: guarding installations, protecting convoys, supporting humanitarian assistance operations, intelligence and reconnaissance, logistical and support, military training, strategic planning and combat.

However the need to have Africa's own effective peacekeeping force has not been overlooked by development partners. Africa Crisis Response Initiative ACRI , is an initiative fronted by the United States with the aim to capacity building within the Africa military with a bias to restabilising an strategies. Some military analysts however perceive it as a strategy by the West to escape the responsibility of assisting Africa in peacekeeping operations. "The ACRI is a great idea that needs to be expanded. More African nations need to commit to the concept - and why not? It is all paid for by the Americans and it does much to professionalise African militaries making them more effective, more responsible to civilian governments and less likely to commit human rights abuses. To be honest, the ACRI is a kind of sop the Americans are using to get out of the guilt of not committing their own powerful military to African problems. The reality is that the United States is a democracy and the leaders realize that there is no way to gain enough popular support for the risky peace operations necessary to bring peace to Africa. ACRI could be a realistic alternative to PMCs, but it will take much more commitment from Africa - and even then I don't see it becoming a decisive force in the near future," says a Kenyan based military analyst who did not wish to be named.

Currently, no international law regulates the operations of PMCs although several instruments have been devised to counter the mercenary threat. According to the definition of mercenaries in the international law, PMCs do not qualify to be mercenaries basically because they are contracted by one of the parties to fight along that party's side. However, where the recruiting party is a rebel movement, such a PMC is deemed as a mercenary outfit. Hence the inadequacy and the inappropriateness of the current international law.

International legal instruments that aim to counter the mercenary threat include the Geneva Convention adopted in June 1977 that prevents mercenaries from having the status of prisoners of war during conflicts. The Convention for the Elimination of Mercanarism in Africa adopted by the Organisation of Africa Unity in 1977 and put in force in 1985 aims to protect the nations from the thereat of mercenarism to the independence, sovereignty and harmonious development of OAU members. The third instrument, which is yet to be adapted by most countries is the International Convention Against the Use, Financing Recruitment and Training of Mercenaries that was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989.

According to Doug Brooks there are enough lessons why Africa should opt for PMCs to stabilise volatile nations rather than wholly depending on the UN peacekeeping operations. The nature and scale of African wars is largely exaggerated according to Brooks. The wars are generally characterised by comparatively small, lightly armed, under-trained and poorly led armies. PMCs can therefore assemble the small professional armies, trainers and equipment necessary to end the conflict in remarkably short order.

PMCs are affordable. South African company Executive Outcomes (disbanded in 1998) was hired by the government of Sierra Leone and in less than two years won the war back in 1996. The whole operation cost about US dollars 36 million compared to the US dollars 3 million that the UN is currently spending in Sierra Leone per day or equally, the US dollars 3 billion spent during the failed Somali operation.

PMCs are effective due to the small nature of size that makes possible their transportation anywhere at a short notice. They are small and less intrusive than state sponsored missions. While current UN mission is Sierra Leone could reach 17,000 troops, Executive Outcomes used less than 300 men in Sierra Leone in 1996 and Sandline International used a few dozen men to assist Nigerians recapture Freetown in 1997.

It is however obvious that Africa still needs to establish a long-term political solutions to check on the continents' numerous conflict. The newly democratised nations need to develop institutions to ensure stability and security.