A Fool's Errand

Last week Sierra Leone rebel leader Foday Sankoh and his gruesome Revolutionary United Front (RUF) captured some 500 United Nations peacekeepers. Their whereabouts remains unknown. In earlier clashes, Mr. Sankoh's forces have stripped peacekeepers of everything, even their uniforms, and marooned them in the bush. Later, the troops stumbled into camp and told their humiliating tale, which led several governments to conclude that peacekeeping in Sierra Leone is a fool's errand. As a result, Nigeria and Kenya both withdrew their peacekeeping troops last week. This is precisely the result Mr. Sankoh desired. Last summer's peace accord, which the U.N. was trying to enforce, is in tatters.

Mr. Sankoh knows that time is on his side. The rebels control the nation's extensive diamond mines, which provide a source of bargaining power and war funds. In short, the rebels already hold the nation's economy captive and will soon make a prisoner of its capital city.

There are lessons here for international policymakers. Not all the world's messes can be sorted out by sending in the Blue Berets; and when used, their operations need to be planned and executed with the same care that is used in other military operations. A serious, well-armed approach has been shown to work in Sierra Leone.

In 1997, a previous government called in the South African paramilitary outfit Executive Outcomes. In a few weeks, the small, South African-trained and equipped mercenary force drove the rebels from the outskirts of the capital and overran their heavily fortified bases near the diamond mines. The mercenaries set up a massive defense perimeter and operated the mines at full tilt. For the next few months, much of the countryside was peaceful and the national economy came back to life. And the rebels were dispirited, hungry and increasingly broke. Their numbers dwindled.

Then the U.N. stepped in to broker a peace agreement and hold free elections. The rebels insisted that the government's contract with Executive Outcomes be immediately terminated. Once it was, Mr. Sankoh's forces gradually gained ground. Within a year, they again controlled the mines.

What the mercenary expedition demonstrates is that a small, well-armed and well-trained force can make peace in Sierra Leone. This may not be the job of U.N. peacekeepers, but the current approach is doomed to failure. The U.S. Air Force is prepared to transport a battalion of perhaps 800 Bangladeshi troops into the war-torn capital. Like the rest of the multinational peacekeeping force, Bangladesh's troops will be lightly armed. While that will bring the U.N. combined force up to 11,100, it may just be increasing the number of Mr. Sankoh's hostages.