The Dogs of War Go
Corporate
The London News
Review, March 19, 2004
Peter W.
Singer,
National
Security Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
A planeload of
mercenaries that touches down in the middle of the night, an evil
dictator who tortures his victims on the beach, shady multinational
oil interests, an arms deal gone sour, and the key protagonist a
former SAS trooper whose last job was acting in a movie: it has all
the ingredients of a Hollywood blockbuster. But the Logo Logistics
affair of Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea is just the latest
appearance on the international stage of an important global
development—the privatised military industry.
Private military
firms are business providers of professional services intricately
linked to warfare. That is, they are corporate bodies that
specialise in the sale of military skills. They do everything, from
leasing out commando teams and offering the strategic advice of
ex-generals to running the outsourced supply chains for the US and
now British armies.
Such firms represent
the evolution, globalisation, and corporatisation of the age-old
mercenary trade.
The private military
industry got its start in the early 1990s with the rise of the firm
Executive Outcomes, the very same South African company that Simon
Mann and many of the other coup suspects used to work with.
Executive Outcomes, which was linked with multinational mining and
energy interests, fought in Angola, Sierra Leone and Congo. While
the firm formally went out of business in 1999, its success spawned
a global industry of copy cats. In the decade since it began, the
private military industry has mushroomed. Private military firms now
operate in more than 50 countries and do up to $100bn business a
year.
In Iraq, for
example, there are more than 15,000 private military contractors.
They protect convoys and key installations, train the Iraqi police,
paramilitary, and army, and also do mundane chores like feeding
troops and fuelling vehicles. The biggest player in Iraq is Dick
Cheney's scandal-plagued Halliburton firm, presently besieged by a
series of accounting and overbilling gaffes, but there are also a
number of UK-based companies.
One is Global Risks,
reported to have 100 former British SAS troopers, 500 former
Nepalese Ghurkas and 500 ex-Fijian soldiers working on the ground in
Iraq. This one company has the sixth largest troop contingent in the
coalition. Thus, President Bush's international effort has finally
come to pass, except to be completely honest he might want to rename
it the "Coalition of the Billing".
In a world where we
police even the fat content of cookies, perhaps what is most
surprising is that this industry, so central to national and global
security, is completely unregulated. No international laws apply.
National laws are little better, with the majority of states,
including Britain, having none that fully controls the
firms.
Zimbabwe, for
example, can only charge the suspected coup plotters with firearms
and immigration indictments. In addition, many firms that claim to
be "British" or "South African" are actually registered in tax
havens such as the Caymans, Bahamas, and Channel Isles.
Firms in the
industry often argue that the lack of rules is not a problem, as
they claim only to work for "reputable" clients, and have corporate
codes and structures that preclude misbehaviour.
But the news from
Zimbabwe pokes yet another hole in that thin claim. To begin with,
voluntary codes of conduct are just that, written by the firms
themselves, voluntarily adhered to and carrying no punishment if
broken, either by the firms or their individual employees. Thus, it
is up to the firms to decide who they want to hire—the Logo
indictees range from class act veterans to a gentleman under
indictment back home for murder—and who they want to work
for.
Some firms have
worked for democracies, the UN and even environmental groups, while
others have prospered at the other end of the marketplace, working
for dictators, drug cartels and terrorist-linked groups. Indeed,
Logo illustrates the very problem of firms determining reputable
clients for themselves. Who was the legitimate player to choose, the
dodgy coup plotters or the dictator who took power by killing his
uncle? Legitimacy is hard enough to determine in international
politics, and even more difficult when millions in potential profits
comes into play.
The private military
industry has grown up, but our regulation and oversight has not kept
pace. International and national laws must be updated to account for
the behaviour of businesses in war and, in particular, control who
they can work with. Likewise, if governments such as those in the US
and UK are to continue to be clients of such firms, they must become
more business-savvy, and establish sound competition and supervision
in their outsourcing. War is far too important to be left to the
CEOs.
©
Copyright 2004 The London News
Review
Note: The views
expressed in this piece are those of the author and should not be
attributed to the staff, officers or trustees of The Brookings
Institution