Comment by Sandline International
9 October 2000: ITN interview with UK Shadow Defence Secretary

Iain Duncan-Smith, the UK Shadow Defence Secretary gave an interview to Channel 4 Television (Independent Television News) last month at the time of the press comment on the extent of the relationship between British military personnel and private contractors (who had previously worked for Executive Outcomes and Sandline) hired by the Sierra Leone government to fly their attack helicopters. The following is a transcript of the four minute segment broadcast on 7 September. It contains a number of illuminating and supportive comments made by Mr Duncan-Smith on the role that PMCs and their personnel can play in such conflicts. A RealPlayer recording of the interview can be downloaded here.

Interviewer: .... asked for an interview tonight, but they [the UK government] weren't willing to put a Minister forward, nor would they allow us to talk to the British spokesman for the forces in Sierra Leone. Instead they told us they did not treat the men shown as "mercenaries", rather as "employees" of the Sierra Leone government. And they issued a statement, this one, saying, "A British Squadron Leader is in Sierra Leone as part of the international military advisory and training team, which is advising on the establishment of effective, democratic armed forces. The Squadron Leader's role is to advise on the establishment of the government of Sierra Leone's air wing. He is not in charge of the government of Sierra Leone's helicopters." Well, we're joined now from our Westminster studio by the Shadow Defence Secretary, Iain Duncan-Smith. Any questions in your mind, Iain Duncan-Smith, about this?

Iain Duncan-Smith: Well, not really, no, because I visited Sierra Leone with the Secretary of State about four or five weeks ago and we met the individual you are talking about now, and we met him in the company of British officers who were all quite clear about their engagements with him and involvement with him, and I don't think that they can possibly deny any involvement and the reality is that all of them, and I must agree with them, think that by and large he's done a pretty good job. So, what we've got here is the Ministry of Defence, quite rightly, using the services of, I think they're engaged by the Sierra Leone government, this man's services, but the Foreign Office absolutely point blank refusing to allow any mercenary involvement and trying to block it. You've got a division in government really.

Interviewer: But in a way we're back to Sandline. I mean, a company has been contracted to operate ­ it's a very fine dividing line between mercenaries and employees, isn't it?

Iain Duncan-Smith: Well, I've always taken a fairly straightforward view about the involvement of mercenaries ­ if the legitimate government decides that it needs to use mercenaries: bona-fide companies, not just odds-and-sods, but bona-fide companies, then I think it has to be able to use them because a government like the one in Sierra Leone just didn't have access to organised armed forces and the result was that the RUF were basically winning the war. Now what's actually happened is, because the Foreign Office has point blank refused to accept that they should use mercenaries, the British government has, therefore, had to get deeply involved with British troops and I think that's the problem: if you don't allow them to use the mercenaries or to organise them in the way that they would, as many of the government, by the way, said to me when I was out there, then the result is that they go cap-in-hand to Britain and other countries to come and bail them out and that's what we've got ourselves into now.

Interviewer: Now, the problem is part of accountability and part it's the UN's regulations on these matters and the United Nations are more than queasy about having these people there.

Iain Duncan-Smith: Well, they are queasy because what could be done, and what should be done, I think, is that we should look carefully at ways in which these sort of organisations can be better legitimised and better policed. The problem is that just a simple point-blank refusal to accept that they exist is just like an ostrich sticking one's head in the sand where really there are companies, there are groups, who could be properly organised, who could do the job that's necessary without always having to involve governments like Britain bringing their own soldiers in.

Interviewer: The problem, as we speak, is that you have the aid worker there protecting the human rights abuses that may well be flowing from an inadequately commanded structure.

Iain Duncan-Smith: Well, I think all those sort of problems can be overcome and have been overcome and, in fact, as I said before, the officers concerned and the soldiers out there from the British Army and the Royal Air Force spoke glowingly of the pilot you were referring to in your report earlier on, saying that he had done, by and large, a very good job. The real problem is that the UN force out there has been pretty well just short of pathetic. They will not go on the offensive against the RUF: they have failed so far to really deal with the terrorists and the result is we've got British soldiers now taken hostage and we're reliant on the UN. As I said, it's just not doing enough. That's where the problem comes from ­ the Foreign Office's policy is falling apart; the MoD is having to deal with these mercenaries and Robin Cook refused point-blank to accept it.

Interviewer: Iain Duncan-Smith, thank you very much for joining us.

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