On the 14th of this month the Parliamentary Human Rights Group at the House of Commons (tel: +44 20 7219 3446) published a report entitled ‘The Business of Killing’, authored by Philip Trewhitt. In her introduction to the report, Ann Clwyd MP, the Chair of the Group, stated: ‘This report seeks to put the morality of [PMCs’] business to one side and asks whether the Private Military Companies of the 1990s could and should be allowed to operate based on their actions, not on moral distaste for their business. The report looks at what the future might hold for them and their possible effect on UK foreign policy.’
In this comment piece we reproduce some of the more illuminating observations made in the report and, for the record, highlight and correct errors of fact which may otherwise impact on the public perception of Sandline.
In summary, we welcome the publication of the report and hope that it will continue to stimulate the debate about the effectiveness and value that Private Military Companies can deliver in areas of conflict around the world where the international community is either unwilling or unprepared to intervene.
On differentiating Private Military Companies and mercenaries
There are ordinary mercenaries; there are private security firms; and there are PMCs.
[PMCs] have a distinct corporate character. They are designed to be permanent, rather than just ad hoc organisations for single jobs.
According to [the] Special Rapporteur to the UN Commission on Human Rights on the use of mercenaries: ‘… [PMCs] cannot be strictly considered as coming within the legal scope of mercenary status’.
… experience in Angola, Sierra Leone and elsewhere has shown that when the PMCs are expelled, their role is often filled by traditional mercenaries, with none of the vested interest in respectability and long-term credibility of PMCs.
On what PMCs have achieved
… the government forces continued to pressure UNITA until Savimbi was finally forced to the negotiating table, due in large part to [the PMC’s] efforts.
Within one year, some element of political stability had been regained [in Sierra Leone], and elections were set for March 1996.
The termination of the deal [with Papua New Guinea] provided a springboard for mediation resulting in the Lincoln Agreement of January 1998 and a permanent ceasefire signed in April 1998.
… the value of hiring a PMC as a force multiplier and trainer far outstrips that of channelling the money directly to the [indigenous] armed forces.
… the Gulf War and current NATO action in Yugoslavia have showed how powerless less developed countries are against state of the art conventional warfare. Unorthodox conflict needs unorthodox resolution and PMCs … can operate successfully at this lower level.
On the role that PMCs could play
… there is the argument that … properly run PMCs might be a force for good.
PMCs will take sides and will act pre-emptively. They are unencumbered by the political shackles which accompany most international efforts. They can deploy faster, have a clearer chain of command, compatible training and equipment and a pool of combat-proven soldiers. They are considerably more cost effective that UN/sub-regional deployments.
Stability brought about by PMCs can attract foreign investment and an increase in aid.
If PMCs only supported democratically elected governments, then they would in fact be helping to support human rights of the citizens of the country.
The likes of EO and Sandline do not presume to offer long-term solutions and thus cannot be blamed when the international community — which has often applied the pressure for them to leave — fails to produce the resources necessary for continued stability after they leave.
On Human Rights
Despite much effort by various organisations, allegations of human rights abuses are mostly unproven.
It is, perhaps, also significant that … the numerous NGOs and other organisations (such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) which have looked into the company’s activities have found so little evidence of abuse.
Harder to dismiss in a country devastated by two armies with little concept of human rights are the words of one Sierra Leonean observer on EO’s impact: ‘Wherever they went, civilians stopped dying’.
There are no reports that [Sandline’s] employees have been responsible directly for any human rights abuses.
On the UN and international peacekeepers
[PMCs] are fulfilling a role which should more properly be filled by the UN or sub-regional forces, who carry with them the backing of the international community. The UN, however, has shown itself increasingly unwilling to fulfil its capabilities.
If the UN had provided the peacekeepers promised to the Sierra Leonean government by Kofi Annan in 1997 if they ceased to employ EO, then the Koroma coup might never have happened and the country might have been spared years of appalling warfare and brutality.
[PMCs’] charges compare very favourably with the cost-effectiveness of international intervention.
On the questions of accountability, utilisation and regulation
The perception that, in some situations, PMCs have fulfilled a role more properly given to the UN, might lead to the suggestion that PMCs should be brought under UN auspices, thereby relieving pressure on the UN to act and removing concerns over accountability.
The important thing about accountability, however, is that although it may not prevent all abuses, it does allow for the abusers to be punished.
PMCs may not be lovable, but they are undoubtedly better than some of the alternatives.
The demand for hired soldiers is constant and likely to remain so. If PMCs are forced out of business, then the people involved will continue to ply their trade as traditional mercenaries with no accountability, no interest in their long-term good name and therefore a disregard for human rights much more considerable than any suggested for a PMC.
On the ‘Arms to Africa’ Affair
[The UN Security Council] calling for strong support for military action, yet only giving encouragement to peaceful negotiations was one of the first of many confusions.
Foreign Office briefings of the time referred to sanctions being imposed ‘against the junta’, and Tony Lloyd, a Foreign Office minister referred to sanctions ‘against the junta’ during a House of Commons debate on Sierra Leone.
In general, ‘it was a reasonable — if incorrect — conclusion … that the embargo was confined to the junta’. [ref: Select Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Second Report on Sierra Leone.]
UN legal advisors have since construed the [UN] resolution as having the aim of restoring President Kabbah and thus not strictly applying to the ECOMOG forces who were trying to bring about his return to power.
[Tim Spicer] ‘may have assumed that he had been given tacit approval [by HMG]’. [ref: Legg Report.]
Unfortunately, as well as the above interesting extracts there were a number of factual inaccuracies within the report which, for the record, we have corrected below in order to protect Sandline’s reputation:
‘SRC (EO’s parent company) and Sandline share the services of Plaza 107 in London.’ Fact: neither SRC or any of its subsidiary companies are or at any time have been clients of Plaza 107, nor have they ever operated out of Plaza 107’s offices.
‘… EO was registered [in London] by businessmen Anthony Buckingham and Simon Mann.’ Fact: Executive Outcomes Limited was registered in the UK by Eeben Barlow. Neither Messrs Buckingham or Mann had any involvement in this process as is clearly evidenced in the publicly available records maintained at Companies House.
‘Tony Buckingham … and Eeben Barlow, the then Chief Executive of EO, were signatories to a Hong Kong bank account held by Sandline Holdings.’ Fact: Mr Barlow was never a signatory of an account by the name of Sandline Holdings or any other Sandline named company. This was proven to the Commission of Inquiry from whose report the above was extracted shortly before its publication by the presentation of a letter from Sandline’s bankers.
‘The fee [in Papua New Guinea] was $36 million dollars, part of which would come in the form of a stake in the Panguna copper mine.’ Fact: no part of the fee payable or paid to Sandline was in the form of mineral interests. The contract has been widely published on the Internet (and can be found on the Sandline site in the hotlinks section) and demonstrates clearly that payment took a purely monetary form.
‘[Fuel-air explosive bombs] were also imported to Papua New Guinea for potential use during EO’s subcontracted operations there.’ Fact: no such bombs have ever been imported into or procured by Papua New Guinea from Sandline. The schedule of deliverables comprising part of the relevant contract is appended to the contract referred to above.
‘Much of [Sandline’s] equipment was impounded in Australia.’ Fact: none of Sandline’s equipment has ever been impounded in Australia or, for that matter, any other country. Equipment was stored in Australia at their invitation during the course of the now settled contractual dispute with Papua New Guinea. This equipment is currently in the process of being sold and will be exported to suitable client destinations once these sales are concluded.
‘A PNG delegation inspecting [the] equipment provided by Sandline found that the helicopters were older models than those promised and charged for and the rockets were in poor condition’. Fact: the helicopters were exactly what was required to undertake the project and met the contractual terms. According to an inventory prepared by Australian military personnel the boxes containing the rockets had ‘some surface rust’ but the rockets themselves were listed as ‘serviceable’.
‘Lifeguard … deliberately or through force of circumstance, was responsible for supplying a shipment of arms to the AFRC [rebels] in Sierra Leone.’ Fact: Lifeguard has never supplied weaponry to the AFRC or any other rebel group. When Freetown was overrun by the rebels in 1996 all the company’s equipment and weapons stock which Lifeguard’s personnel were unable to remove or cache was seized by this rebel group.
‘The $10 million [for Sandline’s services in Sierra Leone] was to be supplied in return for diamond concessions’. Fact: Sandline was remunerated monetarily. The concessions were to be awarded directly by the government to the independent sponsor in exchange for his provision of the project finance.